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Abstract 
The conflicting interest between principals’ and the intermediary role played by Estate Surveyors and Valuers 
during real estate negotiation could prone the latter to influence from these principals’ as evident in valuation. 
The research which entailed a survey of 159 Estate Surveyors and Valuers in Lagos metropolis was analyzed 
with the use of descriptive statistics and the Relative Important Index. It was discovered that potential tenants are 
most apt in influencing real estate negotiation which is usually carried out with the use of reward powers and 
information power where pecuniary gains are offered to Estate Surveyors and Valuers in order to accomplish 
their whims while access to information by these principals are also used against the Estate Surveyor and Valuer 
working in an unfamiliar terrain respectively.  
The researchers therefore opines that a wakeup call by both the Nigerian Institution of Estate Surveyors and 
Valuers and the Estate Surveyors and Valuers Registration Board of Nigeria in curbing the prevalence of this 
influence will help preserve the integrity of the Estate Surveying and valuation profession.   
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1. Introduction 
Outcomes in the property market are set on an individual transaction basis by negotiators whose motives, talent, 
and aspirations are usually conflicting. This usually ends up in an agreement that is preconceived at the same 
time as a “win-win situation” by parties involved ((Muhlebach, 2005; Morris, 1990). According to Neale and 
Bazerman (1992b) the greatest performance and potential for improvement in negotiation lies on access to 
information. There is an envisaged inexorability in negotiation in the property market as every stake holder 
works on available information in a bid to at least satisfying ones’ position. An aftermath of a study by Institute 
for Corporate Real Estate (1992) identified negotiation as the key skill for success in corporate real estate, the 
study revealed that industries in a bid for improved results are dedicating more resources to the negotiation effort; 
also over the years there has been much importance ascribed to the real estate negotiation process (Rondeau, 
1993). Hence, research has revealed advocates of improved models in order to enhance performances in the 
negotiating process particularly by authors in the behaviourial sciences, while (Neale and Bazerman, 1992a) 
argue that effective negotiation models must embody descriptive elements; Thompson (1990) suggests that 
psychological theories of negotiation should include motivational and cognitive dimensions.  
Notwithstanding the call on the importance attached to negotiation in real estate dealings, the subject has only 
been stressed by a small number of research activities. Black and Diaz (1996) in a series of experiments on 
property negotiation focusing on anchoring effects, in which students and real estate professionals were asked to 
simulate a bargaining situation, reveals an inappropriate weighting of asking prices, even if those were 
inconsistent with available market data. In the same way Aycock (1999), tested the relative strengths of asking 
prices versus initial purchase prices as anchors in negotiated settlements. However, the author focused on 
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property professionals and their buyer knowledge; while issues on negotiation were left aside.  
Instances of a party having multiple negotiating experiences with the opposite party came up in the research 
carried out by Asami and Teraki (1991). The authors attempted to find an optimal order of negotiation for a real 
estate developer facing sequential negotiation with several landowners by analyzing models of land procurement 
by a developer. The researcher suggests that it may be optimal for the developer to procure land unit which is 
never used in the development, so as to strengthen his bargaining position. Moreover in the case of differential 
size in landowners' units where all units are required, the developer will likely choose to negotiate with the 
owner with the largest land unit so as to maximize his payoff.  
The introduction of a third party usually referred to as agents in real estate negotiation took various detection in 
real estate research. Bazerman et al. (1992) discovered that while the use of a third-party mediator produced little 
impact on settlement price, the use of a real estate agent increased the settlement price as well as the probability 
of deadlock. Valley et al. (1992) on the impact of information shared with third-party real estate agents 
discovered that settlement prices were higher when buyer reservation prices were shared with agents and lowest 
when agents knew only seller reservation prices. In lease negotiation, Pfrang and Wittig (2008) showed that 
brokers' influence on the behaviour of the negotiating partners can contribute to the efficiency of negotiation 
processes and the perceived contract utility. There was also the identification of mutual concessions and the 
creation of incentives and additional negotiation subjects as possibilities in improving the attractiveness of a 
lease contract and also in reaching more beneficial contract provisions. These the authors achieved by modeling 
a game-theoretical framework that covers the basic mechanisms of lease contract negotiations while making 
allowance for relevant behavioural aspects.  
Other researches in lease negotiation have been approached from various perspectives. Hutchison et al. (2010) 
considered the negotiating strengths of landlords and tenants in lease negotiation. The study being comparative 
in nature between the well established deposit system in Seoul, the South Korean market, geared towards the 
application of same in the UK market, was aimed at calculating the level of deposit necessary to mitigate any 
inherent income risk particularly during the down phase of the property cycle when supply of space exceeds 
demand and business conditions are uncertain. It was discovered that tenants were unwilling to pay deposits and 
landlords were more inclined to offer incentives in a bid to get the property let, even though the down phase is 
exactly the time when a deposit system is needed most. The researchers thereby suggested that landlords should 
be looking through the cycle and insisting that deposits are paid at the height of the market when their bargaining 
strength is stronger. The deposit is required to be sufficient, at least 15 months’ rent, so as to cover the 
probability of income loss in the down phase of the cycle. McAllister and Tarbert (1999) analysed the rental 
negotiation process prior to lease expiry. The authors tested the findings from earlier research that tenants may 
use the threat of lease termination at rental negotiations in order to obtain concessions in the rent or other 
incentives. The authors noted that the bargaining process will often cause deviation from what they term as an 
equilibrium solution. In their analysis the concession level of the landlord was discovered to be a function of four 
variables comprising the expected landlord’s cost of void, probability of tenant relocation, landlord’s risk 
preference and the effects of the bargaining process. Also within rental negotiations, the differences between rent 
reviews/lease renewals and open market lettings were examined by Crosby and Murdoch (2000). The authors 
argued that in both rent reviews and lease renewals the rental negotiations were usually on a one-to-one basis 
which contrasts with open market lettings where a full marketing process normally occurs. At rent review/lease 
renewal, if there was an inability to agree, third parties may determine the rent at review or renewal. This 
contrasted with the case of an open market letting where the absence of agreement may cause the proposed deal 
to collapse. 
The estate agent who has prominent role to play particularly as it regards bringing two separate parties together 
should have what it takes to build confidence in them. This would invariably amongst others reduce if not totally 
eliminate dual-loyalty conflict agents’ face from principals (Kurtzberg et al., 2005). One way of eliminating such 
could be by training and education. Myerscough and Tyler (1991) advocated the need for negotiation education; 
the case for formal negotiation training, the provision of training for the surveyors, timing of the training 
provision, and the effectiveness of various teaching methods for training the surveyor was outlined. ElShenawy 
(2010) tested the main effect of negotiation training-level on acquiring negotiation skills. Six meta-analyses were 
conducted over 57 lab experiments from 36 studies. The six meta-analyses were divided into two groups each 
with a sub-study. The objective of study one was finding the effect of training level on negotiators' individual 
and joint performance while the objective of study two is contrasting the effects of three training levels on 
negotiators' performance. The study sustained the position as discoveries were made of an increase in 
negotiators' performance linked to higher training level. Hardin (1997) discovery on the function of training on 
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the subject of real estate negotiation was from a banker’s perspective, coming to the conclusion that a lender’s 
perception of the attractiveness of a potential loan was a function of the lender’s training and experience. 
Ashcroft (2004) recognizing the difficulty in assessing outcomes of commercial negotiation; such as the impact 
on the short- and long-term buyer/seller relationship and the negotiator's personal and organizational 
development buttressed the need for negotiators’ to understand and develop commercial negotiation skills in the 
context of the buying/selling dynamics using the writer's experience as a Lead Negotiator. The author explored 
the commercial negotiation skills from three perspectives; the process, the respective parties' objectives and 
bargaining. The author however acknowledges that deriving such commercial negotiation skills though valuable 
could be demanding, and often a personally challenging task. Apart from the acquisition of cognate skills in real 
estate negotiation, planning has also been regarded as a veritable requirement in such operation (Nourse, 1990). 
Estate agents without prejudice to what they are being called anywhere around the globe are involved in various 
negotiations from principals such as vendors, buyers, landlords, tenants, prospective landlord and prospective 
tenants, perhaps due to their role as the intermediary between/amongst these principals. It could be arguable then 
that this situation could expose the agent to various forms of influence by these principals so as to attain their 
whims as has been established in real estate valuation process (Amidu and Aluko, 2007; Baum et. al., 2000; 
Chinloy, Cho and Megbolugbe, 1997; Cho and Megbolugbe, 1996; Crosby et al., 2004; Iroham, 2007; Kinnard, 
Lenk and Worzala, 1997; Ogunba, 1997)  
Chen and Yu (2009) attempted to analyze client influence on valuation both in Taiwan and Singapore. The choice 
of both countries was due to their similar level of economic development as well as professionalism amongst 
valuers practicing in the countries. However, although both are Chinese-dominated by population, the culture 
and language used are substantially different. The study used a survey questionnaire to sample valuers’ response 
to client influence in both Taiwan and Singapore. The questionnaire was organized into five parts: social 
economic data, client influence situation, potential factors, influence method, and influence abilities. The survey 
findings were analyzed using SPSS and subjected to a number of standard procedures to check for missing 
values and multivariate normality. Mean difference and F-test were used to judge whether the valuers in the two 
countries have significantly different views on client influence. The researchers’ discovered that client influence 
on valuation practices does exist in both Taiwan and Singapore. This is despite the differences in the market 
structures, development background and modes of doing business. Furthermore, the study found out that the 
degree and extent of the problem are different. These differences, as reflected in the differing views and opinions 
on the causes and factors leading to client pressure, were largely due to the systemic differences in the two 
countries, particularly, in the way businesses are conducted as well as the medium of communication being used. 
The purpose of valuation sought for by clients’ was also discovered to be a preeminent factor that triggers 
clients’ influence (Iroham, 2007). The study which entailed the survey of 95 Estate Surveying firm in the Lagos 
metropolis revealed that mortgage valuation was mostly influenced in Nigeria. Other factors such as the type of 
client, the characteristics of valuers and valuation firms, the purpose of a valuation and the information 
endowments of clients and valuers also influence clients’ influence (Levy and Schuck, 1999). Also clients having 
expertise and a high level of knowledge of the property market like permitting clients to review draft valuations 
prior to their formalization as is evident in a country such as New Zealand have also been discovered to 
influence valuation (Levy and Schuck, 2005). Certain ways by which clients’ effect such influences amongst 
which is offering of higher fees to valuers’ or made to continue future engagement. At other times, professional 
fees are denied - a phenomenon described by Kohli (1989) as the reward and coercive power of clients 
respectively.  
The influence experienced by valuers/appraisers can probably be experienced amongst agents as clients’ who are 
described as principals’ in negotiation processes could exhibit tendencies outlined by their counterparts 
requesting valuation. This is what has prompted this research in a bid to discovering which principal- 
vendor/seller; buyer; lessor/landlord; /lessee/sitting tenant; prospective landlord; or prospective tenant- 
influences the negotiating process and by what medium such influences are being exhibited on the Estate 
Surveyor and Valuer.   
2. Research Method 
The study focused on Lagos metropolis due to its vibrant property market (being the undisputed commercial 
capital of the country). Besides, the Directory of the Nigerian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers, 
(NIESV, 2009) reveals that almost 50% of the head offices of all of Nigeria’s Valuation firms are located in that 
metropolis. 
The study investigated Principals’ influence on Estate Surveyors and Valuers when it comes to negotiation of 
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property both by vendors and also purchasers. The research focused on Estate Surveyors and Valuers as the study 
populations who are major valuation intermediary in property marketing. Out of the 270 firms in the study area, 
the use of a demographic formula by Otte (2006) resulted to a total of 159 Estate Surveying firm representing 
about 59% of the sample frame was calculated as an appropriate sample size for this study. This represented the 
total number of questionnaires issued for the study. The research adopted stratified random sampling as its 
sampling method. Lagos metropolis was stratified into six zones, namely, Lagos Island, Victoria Island, Ikoyi 
Island, Apapa Island, Surulere and Ikeja business district (as adopted by Ogunba, 1997; Ogunba and Ajayi, 1998; 
Iroham 2007). Thereafter, there was random selection of subjects in each stratum.  
Questions investigated various aspects of client influence as evident in literature particularly in the case of 
valuations. The views of respondents were measured in a graded manner, using Likert (ordinal) scales. The data 
were analyzed by means of descriptive statistical techniques, and weighted average frequencies.  
3. The Results  
From the sample size, a total of 122 (representing 76.7%), of the distributed questionnaires were duly retrieved. 
Respondents were found to be mostly between the ages of 31-35 years. The average respondent had practical 
experience spanning about 5 years. The most typical academic qualification of respondents was a B.Sc degree 
(about 63% of respondents) while others had little stint in various higher degrees.  
Preliminary questions investigated the occurrence of clients’ influence on negotiation of real estate. Although 
Estate Surveyors who are interchangeably described as agents in this research were trying to dodge the existence 
of such phenomena, ardent investigation into the subject matter reveals that such does exist particularly in a 
closed market system. According to their responses, that does not preclude its existence also in an open market 
situation. Investigation was geared towards discovering who amongst the principals- a term interchangeably used 
in this research for sellers/vendors; buyers; lessors’/ landlords; lessee/sitting tenants; prospective landlords; 
prospective tenants’- is most apt in influencing negotiation in the property market. Responses were measured on 
an ordinal scale of five with 5 representing principals’ influence on valuations at all times and 1 representing no 
principal influence. Responses in this regard are contained in Table 1(see appendix below). The weighted 
average results calculated from Table 1 is 1.97, 1.79, 2.44, 2.77, 2.66, and 3.18 for sellers/vendors; buyers; 
lessor/landlord; lessee/sitting tenant; prospective landlords; and prospective tenants respectively. On a scale of 5 
it is evident that respondents agree that clients’/principals’ influence on real estate negotiation do exists 
particularly during negotiation for letting.  
The research also investigated into the different forms the principal/client influence takes. Although out of the 
122 respondents whose questionnaires were retrieved only 76 attempted a response to this question as 
respondents showed some level of reticence; however, much persuasion on confidentiality of report exclusively 
used for an academic exercise resulted to their eventual response. However, amongst retrieved questionnaires 
certain respondents still preferred to remain silent in certain options. The investigation made on this question was 
structured as that of Kohli (1989), whose quest into clients influence was ordered under the following headings: 
Reward power (Principals’ ability to mediate material and or non-material rewards to agent); coercive power 
(Principals’ ability to mediate material and or non-material Punishment to agent); referent power (An agents 
regard for and identification with a principal); legitimate power (Formal or Informal norms that call for an 
agents’ compliance with a principal); expert power (An agents’ faith in a principals’ knowlegdeability); 
information power (A principals’ ability to control flow of information to an agent); and departmental power 
(The status of a principal in question). Table 2 and Fig 1 which gives the results of the various powers outlined 
above reveals that reward power and information power are the two most prominent forms of influence exerted 
by the principal on the Estate Surveyor and Valuer respectively. Upon further investigation the study reveals that 
prospective tenants who are most apt in using particularly the reward power do it by influencing the Estate 
Surveyor and Valuer by agreeing to offer the latter their professional fees for two years upfront if the latter can 
help in convincing prospective landlord in collecting one year rent as against the two years which is usually the 
norm in Nigeria. Principals’ are also observed to keep back certain information particularly those that would be 
detrimental to their negotiation prowess; this according to the Estate Surveyors and Valuers is usually evident in 
areas of little or no familiarity of operation.   
4. Recommendation/Concluding Remark 
The reward power used by principals’ in influencing Estate Surveyors and Valuers in the negotiation of real 
estate transaction should be watched and handled with caution so as not to degenerate to the loss of integrity 
amongst these acclaimed “Noble Colleagues”. If the message being put across by prospective tenants is the 
clamour for yearly rental payment in advance then the Nigerian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers 
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(NIESV) and the Estate Surveyors and Valuers Registration Board of Nigeria (ESVARBON) should recommend 
to local authorities or government the payment of yearly rents and work out modalities where banks would be 
responsible for monthly deduction of rents from salaries/wages of prospective tenants and onward credit of same 
to prospective landlords account through the Estate Surveyors and Valuers. The tackling of this at this early stage 
can also prevent the handling down of cash and other pecuniary baits by principals to Estate Surveyors and 
Valuers thereby distorting the entire outcome in the property market.  
Information has also been used by principals’ to influence the Estate Surveyor/Valuer during negotiation. This 
has once more showcased the power of information which Estate Surveyor/Valuer must strive to attain 
particularly while working in an unfamiliar location. The need once more for the creation, management of a 
databank cannot be overemphasized where Estate Surveyors can access instead of making recourse to Principals’ 
for information and at best being left at their mercy in discharging their statutorily function.   
From the moral perspective, the issue of influence should not be condoned as it tends to destroy the intermediary 
role which the agent is to play in real estate negotiation. This should be enforced not minding the principal that 
engaged the Estate Surveyor and Valuer. Contrary to this, the implication is that the market would tend towards 
survival of the fittest and not merely resulting from the power of market forces. In the long run information from 
outcome of any transaction would be handled with levity, which would invariably distort the weight attributed by 
Estate Surveyors and Valuers to earlier comparable transactions in the Property Market.   
Although, this work has succeeded in unraveling the existence of influence in real estate negotiation and how its’ 
been carried out, further works still needs to be done such as probing into its effect in the real property market 
particularly as it affects valuation and the distortion/lagging in sales/purchases of real estate, if any. However; 
this study has opened up another study area in real estate research. 
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Table 1. Propensity of Influence by Principals 
Influence on Real 
Estate Negotiation 
Never Rarely Sometimes Most times Always 
Sellers/Vendors 45 53 11 8 5 
Buyers  49 58 9 4 2 
Landlord/lessor  26 42 36 10 8 
Sitting tenants/lessee 19 33 38 21 11 
Prospective Landlords 14 48 34 17 9 
Prospective Tenants 11 21 43 29 18 
Source: Authors’ field survey 
Table 2. Forms of Principals’ Influence on Negotiation 
Forms of  Influence Vendors’ Buyers’ Landlords’ Tenants’ Prospective 
landlords’ 
Prospective 
Tenants’ 
Reward power 13 11 17 15 19 33 
Coercive power 4 1 6 1 1 - 
Referent Power  2 1 7 3 1 - 
Legitimate Power 6 4 3 8 1 4 
Expert Power  6 5 11 8 - - 
Information Power  12 16 12 18 15 17 
Departmental Power  11 9 11 12 11 8 
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Figure 1. Component Bar Chart of Principals’ Influence on Negotiation 
Source: Authors’ field survey 
